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Article 1

ARTICLES

REFORMING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871:
THE PROBLEM OF POLICE PERJURY
Michael Goldsmith*
Question: Now you just said there was a supervisor or a lieutenant
who joked about [police falsifications] in your presence?
[Officer]: That's correct, sir. Scenarios were, were you going to say
(a) that you observed what appeared to be a drug transaction; (b)
you observed a bulge in defendant's waistband; or (c) you were informed by a male black, unidentified at this time that at that location there were drug sales.
Question: So, in other words, what the lieutenant was telling you is:
here's your choice of false predicates for these arrests?
[Officer]: That's correct. Pick which one you're going to use.'

Testimony Before the City of New York
Commission to Investigate Allegations of
Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption
Procedures of the Police Department, 1994
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University (Visiting Professor, Cornell Law
*
School, Winter 2005). B.S. 1972, J.D. 1975, Cornell University. The author is a
former counsel to the New York State Organized Crime Task Force and former Vicechair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. This Article arose as a result of the
author's representation of Nelson Galbraith, who filed a § 1983 claim after having
been prosecuted for murder based on a falsified autopsy report. See Galbraith v.
County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Professor Goldsmith also serves
on the Board of Directors of the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Kimberlee Hiatt, BYU 2004, for her fine research
assistance, Scott Borrowman, BYU 2005, for his assistance reviewing this manuscript,
and to the BYU reference staff, especially Galen Fletcher and Ron Fuller.
1

COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS

OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-

YoRK, ANATOMY OF FAiLURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS 40-41 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT]
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEW

(quoting an officer's testimony before the Commission).
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INTRODUCTION

Police perjury is no joking matter, nor is it confined to New York
City. In 1999-2000, Texas authorities convicted thirty-eight mostly African American defendants on fabricated narcotics charges. 2 The
Texas experience bore a close resemblance to wrongful prosecutions
that occurred in Vermont approximately thirty years ago, where a single high-profile officer's perjured testimony produced at least seventyone false narcotics convictions. 3
Fortunately, the Vermont victims found some measure of relief by
suing for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the present day codification of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the CRA). 4 This
provision, which Congress enacted after the Civil War to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment,5 imposes civil liability upon "[e]very person
who, under color of [law] . . .subjects . . .any citizen .. . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." 6 However, victims today can no longer rely
upon the CRA to provide adequate relief. An intervening 1983 Supreme Court decision, Briscoe v. LaHue, held that all witnesses who
2 Simon Romero & Adam Liptak, Texas Court Acts to Clear 38 in Town-Splitting
Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at Al (reporting the dismissal of all cases, including those in which defendants had pleaded guilty). Initially, law enforcement authorities conducted a mass arrest of forty-six defendants, which comprised "more than
[ten] percent of Tulia's tiny African-American population." Bob Herbert, Editorial,
Kajka in Tulia, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at A19. When a few defendants convicted at
trial received prison terms ranging from sixty to 300 years, others rushed to plead
guilty in the hope of receiving leniency. Id.; see also ScoTr CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT:
INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTION CASES 2 (2004) (analyzing wrongful convictions
in New
York, but noting a nationwide problem).
3 HAMILTON E. DAVIS, MOCKINGJUSTICE 225-26 (1978); see alsoJoyce Jensen, Full
UnconditionalPardons,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1977, § 4, at 22 (reporting that the Vermont
Governor pardoned seventy-one persons wrongfully convicted of drug charges).

4 The pleadings are on file with the author.
5 In pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person . .. the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Congress enacted section 1 of the CRA, now codified at

42 U.S.C. § 1983, as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 in response to concerns that
state officials of the former Confederacy both permitted and promoted actions to
deprive newly freed slaves of their legal rights. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,
336-39 (1983); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2 (4th ed. 2003) (reviewing the history and purpose of

§ 1983).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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enjoy absolute imcommit perjury at trial, including police officers,
the CRA. 7

munity from civil liability under
The Supreme Court premised Briscoe on the conclusion that the
CRA had not abrogated pre-existing common law immunity for witnesses8 and noted that only legislative reform can repair the resulting
statutory gap. 9 Remarkably, although the decision engendered considerable criticism, I0 none of its critics have proposed reforms that
respond to the Court's suggested legislative solution. Rather than endure passage of another twenty years without congressional response,
this Article reconsiders the Briscoe decision, addresses its impact in
light of recent experience, and proposes legislative reform to eliminate absolute immunity for perjured police testimony.
Part I of this Article explains that the Briscoe decision inevitably
flowed from a series of prior Supreme Court rulings extending common law immunities to defendants sued under the CRA and notes
that these decisions, including Briscoe, all violate the basic principle of
7 460 U.S. at 345-46. The Court stated:
In short, the rationale of our prior absolute immunity cases governs the disposition of this case. In 1871, common-law immunity for witnesses was well
settled. The principles set forth in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), to
protect judges, and in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), to protect
prosecutors, also apply to witnesses, who perform a somewhat different function in the trial process but whose participation in bringing the litigation to
a just-or possibly unjust-conclusion is equally indispensable.
Id.
8 Id. at 336-41. The Court also reasoned that to the extent the Civil Rights Act
may have been motivated by concerns about perjured testimony, Congress was concerned about unjust acquittals rather than wrongful convictions.
This evidence does not, however, tend to show that Congress intended to
abrogate witness immunity in civil actions under § 1, which applied to
wrongs committed "under color of ... law." The bill's proponents were
exclusively concerned with perjury resulting in unjust acquittals-perjury
likely to be committed by private parties acting in furtherance of a conspiracy-and not with perjury committed "under color of law" that might lead to
unjust convictions. In hundreds of pages of debate there is no reference
to . . . perjury by a government official leading to an unjust conviction.

Id. at 339-40.
9 Id. at 344 n.30 ("[I1t is not for us to craft a new rule designed to enable trial
judges ...

to allow recovery in cases of demonstrated injustice .... Congress has the

power to fashion an appropriate remedy if it perceives the need for one.").
10 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY LJ. 1311, 1313 n.12
(1994); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1055 n.78 (1996); TerenceJ. Corrigan, Case Note, Section 1983:
Absolute Immunity for Police Pejury, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), 9 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 687, 697-701 (1984); Eugene Scalia, Comment, Police Witness Immunity Under
§ 1983, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1433, 1433-38 (1989).
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statutory construction that Courts must ordinarily interpret a statute
according to its plain meaning. Part II discusses the nature and extent of perjured testimony in criminal prosecutions, explains why the
threat of criminal prosecution fails to deter perjury, and notes that
congressional reform restricting habeas corpus relief has exacerbated
the problem. Part III both examines the limited range of financial
remedies presently available for the wrongfully convicted and suggests
that, at least when police perjury constitutes a "custom" or "practice,"
Briscoe should not bar § 1983 liability for governmental entities that
promote or tolerate such conduct. Finally, Part IV critiques various
suggested reforms and proposes amending the CRA to eliminate absolute immunity for law enforcement officials who commit perjury.
I.

THE BASIS FOR BPJSCOE: COMMON LAW IMMUNITIES UNDER THE
CRA-WHEN "EvERY PERSON" DOES NOT MEAN "EvERY PERSON"

Section 1983 ostensibly applies to "every person" who violates its
provisions "under color of [law]."'I As such, the Briscoe holding initially appears contrary to both the purpose of the CRA12 and to the
principle of statutory construction requiring courts to interpret legislation according to its plain meaning.' 3 Nevertheless, the Briscoe decision was hardly surprising. Although the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a circuit split,1 4 its CRA decisions since 1951 foreshadowed the outcome in Briscoe. The Court had never read the CRA
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By its terms, § 1983 only applies to actions taken "under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia." Id. It does not generally apply to actions pursuant to
federal law, and it "provides no right of action against federal (rather than state)
officials." Russell v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999). In
the absence of a statutory remedy against federal officers, the Supreme Court has
recognized an implied right of action in various constitutional(but not statutory) provisions. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 (2001)
(noting that the Bivens remedy is at least available for certain violations of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Eighth Amendments).
12 See, e.g.,
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) ("The very purpose of
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional
action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, orjudicial."' (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879))); supra note 5; infra note
27.
13 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:01
(6th ed. 2000).

14

Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 328.

2005]

REFORMING

THE

CIVIL RIGHTS

ACT OF

1871

1263

literally, reasoning instead that § 1983 "cannot be understood in a historical vacuum.

15

For example, starting with Tenney v. Brandhove,1 6 an action alleging that California legislators violated the plaintiffs First Amendment
rights through intimidation, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended the general language of § 1983 "to
overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England...
and carefully preserved in [America]." 17 Accordingly, Tenney held
that Congress did not intend § 1983 to abrogate absolute legislative
immunity under pre-existing common law.' 8 Prior to Briscoe, the Supreme Court employed this reasoning to find that the Forty-Second
Congress, which enacted § 1983, intended to continue common law
immunities for several categories of defendants, including judges, gov19
ernors and other executive officials, and legislators, among others.
Thus, when faced with the question of absolute immunity for witnesses under § 1983, the Briscoe Court readily credited Congress with
awareness of common law witness immunity and concluded that
§ 1983 incorporated that principle. 20 Justice Stevens's majority opinion recognized that this outcome bars relief for wrongfully convicted
defendants, but concluded that "the alternative of limiting the offi'2
cial's immunity would disserve the broader public interest." ' From a
policy standpoint, Justice Stevens expressed concern that without absolute immunity "witnesses might be reluctant to come forward to testify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be
distorted by the fear of subsequent liability."'22 Finally, although the
Court acknowledged that these concerns apply with "diminished

15

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981).

16 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
17 Id. at 376.
18 Id. at 378-79.
19 See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (discussing immunity for
school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (governor and
other executive branch officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) (judges
and police officers); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 (state legislators).
20 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983); cf. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. at
258 (noting that an "important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this
area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles,
including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they
likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to
the contrary").
21 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345.
22 Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
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force" to police officers as compared to private witnesses, 23 it declined
to "carve out an exception to the general rule of immunity in cases of
alleged perjury by police officer witnesses." 2 4
Cumulatively, the Court's willingness to continue common law
immunities for a wide range of governmental officials threatened to
undermine the very purpose of § 1983, which, by definition, only applies to persons acting "under color of [law]" who deprive others of
their constitutional rights. 25 Given this objective, the Briscoe majority's

interpretation of legislative history has been criticized as unduly narrow and improperly selective. 26 More fundamentally, however, Briscoe
and the other CRA immunity decisions contravene perhaps the first
principle of statutory construction: that Courts must give a statute its
plain meaning, unless doing so would produce absurd results. 27 A corollary to this principle further dictates that judges ordinarily may not
23 Id. at 342. In contrast to private citizens, police officers have a duty to testify
and their professional interest in securing convictions "would assertedly counterbalance any tendency to shade testimony in favor of potentially vindictive defendants."
Id. Moreover, they ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from § 1983 liability and
their government employers handle their defense. Id. Further, because juries usually
consider police witnesses to be credible, perjured police testimony is likely to be given
more weight than other witnesses. Id. Finally, the close relationship between prosecutors and the police results in the risk of criminal prosecution being "not an effective substitute for civil damages." Id.
24 Id. at 341-42.
25 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see supra notes 5, 12. Thus, it makes no sense to immunize the same individuals that the statute targets. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 434 (1976) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]o extend absolute immunity to any
group of state officials is to negate ...

the very remedy ...

Congress sought to cre-

ate."); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) (noting that, through the CRA,
"Congress intended 'to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against
those who carry a badge of authority of a State .... whether they act in accordance
with their authority or misuse it"' (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72
(1961))).
26 See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 346-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf Donald H. Zeigler,
A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction,
1983 DuKE L.J. 987, 1011 (noting that legislators from the Forty-Second Congress
expressed concerns about witnesses regularly committing perjury).
27 See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) ("In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its
language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.'" (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980))); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980) (noting that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself").
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28
consider a statute's legislative history to interpret its plain meaning.
Indeed, the strict constructionist Supreme Court routinely applies this
principle, emphasizing that legislative history properly becomes an interpretative tool only when statutory language is ambiguous. 29 In contrast, the text of § 1983, which applies to "every person," 30 is certainly
broad but hardly ambiguous.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has declined to give the CRA its
plain meaning; therefore, "every person" who violates this statute is
not necessarily liable under § 1983. Police officers and other government officials may perjure themselves without risk of statutory civil
liability. Unfortunately, such perjury often contributes to wrongful
convictions.

II.

PERJURY, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, AND HABEAS
CORPUS RESTRICTIONS

Although our criminal justice system is premised on the principle
"that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer,"3' 1 recent experience demonstrates that wrongful convictions
are not uncommon. Based upon a current prison population of
2,000,000, recent studies report that an error rate of just 0.5% would
32
translate into 10,000 wrongful convictions.
28 See 2A SINGER, supra note 13, § 46:04 ("It has been held that the remarks of a
legislator, even the sponsor of the bill, will not override the plain meaning of a
statute.").
29 See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 1593 (2004) (declining to
look to legislative history in interpreting an unambiguous statute); United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (refusing to consider legislative history when the statute was straightforward).
30 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. Indeed, Benjamin Franklin
31
would have placed the ratio at 100:1. Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 173, 175 n.13 (1997) (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin
Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 11 THE WoRxs OF BENJAMIN FRA K.IN 11, 13 (John Bigelow ed., fed. ed. 1904)).
32 C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION
AND PUBLIC POLICY 61-62 (1996) (reporting statistical analysis); see also Daniel
Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1343 (1997) (describing studies reporting an erroneous conviction rate ranging from 0.5% to five percent). This is not a new problem.
See generally EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXv-FvE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at vii (1932) (detailing a landmark study on twentieth century wrongful conviction cases and noting that the sixty-five cases in the study "have
been selected from a much larger number" and that "they come from all sections of
the country"). In capital cases, the erroneous conviction rate has often been higher.
See, e.g., Barry C. Scheck & Sarah L. Tofte, Gideon's Promise and the Innocent Defendant,
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No definitive data exists documenting the degree to which police
perjury accounts for wrongful convictions. However, there is overwhelming anecdotal evidence of widespread police perjury in our
criminal justice system. 33 Most often, it occurs at pretrial suppression
hearings litigating defense claims of police constitutional violations. 34
Since judges finding constitutional error must often suppress incriminating evidence, 3 5 police witnesses anxious to avoid this result can
readily rationalize perjury in the interest of convicting a guilty defendant.3 6 Indeed, this practice has become so common that police officers themselves refer to it as "testilying. ''3 7
Although motions to exclude evidence are designed to vindicate
constitutional rights and rarely touch upon claims of actual innocence, policy perjury at suppression hearings can increase the risk of
Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 38, 38 (reporting that, in 2000, Illinois Governor
George Ryan declared a moratorium on executions after finding that seventeen of
twenty-nine men on death row were innocent); see also Keith A. Findley, Learningfrom
Our Mistakes: A CriminalJustice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L.
REV. 333, 336 (2002) (reporting more than 100 exonerations from death row);
Sharon Cohen & Deborah Hastings, Associated Press, For 110 Inmates Freed by DNA
Tests, True Freedom Remains Elusive, May 28, 2002, available at http://www.truthinjustice.org/truefreedom.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005); Richard C. Dieter, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty: The IncreasingDanger of Executing the
Innocent (1997), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=292#
thirty-two (reporting that of 6000 persons sentenced to death between 1973 and 1996,
courts released sixty-nine based on evidence of innocence).
33 For example, Professor Alan Dershowitz has observed:
Every objective study of police perjury has come to similar conclusions. The
problem of pervasive police perjury is rampant in every major city in the
country. Joseph McNamara, the former police chief of San Jose and Kansas
City . . . recently said that he had "come to believe that hundreds of
thousands of law enforcement officers commit felony perjury every year testifying about drug arrests."
Alan Dershowitz, Editorial, Police Testilying Must Not Be Tolerated, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
11, 1997, at A27; see also Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1041-42 (providing numerous
examples); Scott Cooper, Chemist's Colleagues Saw Warning Signs, DAILY OKLAHOMAN
(Oklahoma City), May 13, 2001, at 1-A (reporting that a state laboratory chemist had
provided dubious testimony in hundreds of cases); David Kocieniewski, New York Pays
a High Pricefor Police Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, § 1, at 1 (reporting the dismissal of
125 cases: "more dismissals than in any other police perjury case on record in the
state"); infra notes 40, 90.
34 See Cloud, supra note 10, at 1312; Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1042-44.
35 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
36 Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1044 ("The most obvious explanation for all this
lying is a desire to see the guilty brought to 'justice.'").
37 MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
THE CHAMPION,
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wrongful conviction. 38 Moreover, when such perjury occurs at trial, it
is even more likely to convict the innocent. 39 The Innocence Project
reports that police misconduct, including perjured testimony, contrib40 and
uted to approximately fifty percent of wrongful convictions,
41
press accounts certainly confirm that the problem is not isolated.
Yet those responsible rarely, if ever, face prosecution. 42 This is hardly
surprising, as the prospect of prosecuting law enforcement personnel
poses an intractable conflict of interest for district attorneys and their
38 For example, when officers falsely rely upon the "plain view" doctrine to explain their failure to obtain a search warrant, they potentially expose innocent people
to wrongful conviction. This can easily occur because crimes such as illegal possession
of narcotics require prosecutors to establish that the defendant acted knowingly. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000) (requiring knowing possession of a controlled substance).
Thus, if the police find narcotics hidden in a bureau drawer, a house guest unaware
of its contents would have a viable defense based on lack of criminal intent. However,
if the officers lacked a warrant (or if their warrant did not authorize them to open
bureau drawers) and they rely upon the plain view doctrine to justify the seizure, their
trial testimony that they found the evidence in an open area will necessarily conflict
with a defendant's legitimate claim of lack of knowledge. See MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 38 (noting practices of claiming to have found evidence in
plain view and falsifying the location of the defendant's arrest).
39 See, e.g., Mitchell Zuckoff, Boston Police "Testilying" Leaves Trail of Injustice, BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 1997, at Al (discussing police fabrications during trial testimony).
In West Virginia, two state laboratory chemists fabricated results in numerous cases.
See Martha Bryson Hodel, W Virginia to Begin Trial for Chemist, DAILY OKLAHOMAN
(Oklahoma City), Sept. 4, 2001, at 8-C. Their work led the West Virginia Supreme
Court to state that "as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by Zain [the state trooper] at any time in any criminal prosecution should be
deemed invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible." State ex rel. McClure v. Trent, 504
S.E.2d 165, 171 n.10 (W. Va. 1998) (per curiam).
40

BARRY

SCHECK ET AL., AcTuAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER

246, 265 (2000).
41 See supra note 33.
42 Between 1999 and 2004, perjury convictions accounted for only seventy-five to
eighty-three of approximately 60,000 offenders sentenced in federal court. Federal
sentencing statistics do not specify how many of these involved police officers. However, the data show that fewer than three percent of these involved enhancements for
abuse of trust, which is the specific offense characteristic that would apply both to
police officers and others in special positions of authority. E-mail from Louis Reedt,
Acting Director, Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Sentencing Commission, to Michael
Goldsmith, Professor of Law, Brigham Young University (Apr. 13, 2004, 11:17:43
EDT) (on file with author); see Lisa C. Harris, Note, Pejury DefeatsJustice, 42 WAYNE L.
REv. 1755, 1768-71 (1996); cf Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, A.B.A.J., May 1995, at
68, 69 (noting that, with few exceptions, "perjury is probably the most underprosecuted crime in America"). This trend dates back more than thirty-five years. See
David W. Eagle, Note, Civil Remedies for Pejury: A Proposalfor a Tort Action, 19 ARIz. L.
REv. 349, 351 (1977) (noting that in 1968, only two of 20,000 federal prisoners were
convicted of perjury).
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED
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federal counterparts. To function effectively, prosecutors depend on
the police to investigate crime. The police, in turn, rely upon prosecutors to obtain convictions through the judicial system. These mutually dependent and supporting roles inevitably require prosecutors
and police to work closely together on a regular basis. A prosecutor
who files perjury charges against a police officer risks jeopardizing this
vital relationship with his law enforcement team. 4 3 Further, although
many officers disdain perjury and those who commit

it,

44

the police

culture historically has maintained a "blue wall of silence '45 against
outside investigations. Thus, few police perjury prosecutions occur
46
nationwide.
But absent an effective criminal sanction, there is little to deter
police perjury. On the contrary, recent legislative reforms, which
both restrict and discourage habeas corpus petitions, have heightened
the problem. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 47 which, despite its title, applies in both capital and noncapital
cases, imposed a one-year limitations period on filing for a writ of
habeas corpus, 48 heightened the standard for filing successive peti43 See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice,
and the American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339,
358 n.75 (1994) (noting that the need for "smooth working relations" explains the
"institutional tendency to tolerate police perjury"). Dissenting in Briscoe,Justice Marshall observed: "[T]he threat of a criminal perjury prosecution ... is virtually nonexistent in the police-witness context ... [because] prosecutors exhibit extreme reluctance in charging police officials with criminal conduct because of their need to maintain close working relationships with law enforcement agencies." Briscoe, 460 U.S. at
365-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Commenting on this relationship, Professor Irving
Younger, a former judge and prosecutor, wrote that "a policeman is as likely to be
indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as he is to be struck down by
thunderbolts from an avenging heaven." Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596, 596; see also Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1047-48 (noting the
conflict of interest stemming from the prosecutor-police relationship).
44 See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 137-49 (providing an example of a corrupt officer's
partner reporting concerns to prosecutors).
45 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Koepke, Note, The Failureto Breach the Blue Wall of Silence:
The Circlingof the Wagons to ProtectPolice Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 213 n.10 (2000)
(citing numerous decisions noting the existence of an unwritten code).
46 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-2255, 2261-2266 (2000)); seeJames S. Liebman, An "EffectiveDeath Penalty"?
AEDPA and ErrorDetection in CapitalCases, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 411, 416-18 (2001) (providing an excellent summary of new provisions); Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas
Corpus Petitions,90 CAL. L. REV. 2101, 2103, 2111-14 (2002) (reviewing AEDPA restrictions and noting the adverse impact on claims of actual innocence).
48 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2000).
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tions contesting a state conviction, 49 made it more difficult to present
50
new evidence in support of a federal habeas claim, narrowed the
51
authority of federal courts to overturn erroneous state court rulings,
and curtailed the right to appeal an adverse ruling denying post-conviction relief.5 2 In light of these measures, police officers contemplating perjury know that defendants are not likely even to obtain a postconviction evidentiary hearing, much less prevail, in federal court.
Taken together, these developments leave the wrongfully convicted
few options for habeas relief. Even if successful, however, an exonerated convict will not likely receive financial indemnification.
III.

RECOVERY OPTIONS FOR THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED

The wrongfully convicted enjoy no right to full compensation for
their loss. Instead, in varying degrees, they are left to whatever monetary or other forms of relief Congress and state legislatures have
chosen to authorize. 5 3 Most jurisdictions, however, provide no compensation whatsoever, and those that do sometimes fail to afford relief
commensurate with the loss incurred. For example, of the fourteen
54
three
states that authorize compensation for wrongful convictions,
49

Id. § 2244(a)-(b).

50 Id. § 2254(e) (2).
51 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-08 (2000) (interpreting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (1)).
52 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
53 See Adele Bernhard, WhenJustice Fails: Indemnificationfor Unjust Conviction, 6 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 73 n.1, 101 (1999) (noting and citing fifteen state statutes providing some compensation for the wrongfully convicted). Since 1999, at least
one jurisdiction has repealed its indemnification law. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 78(a),
§ 16A (2003). Thirty-six states provide no relief for wrongful conviction. See CHRISTIANSON, supra note 2, at 167-86.
54 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 2000) (enacted 1941); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (West 1999) (enacted 1945); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1
(West 1998) (enacted 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241 (West 2003) (enacted
1993); MD ANN. CODE art. 78(a), § 16(A) (2003) (enacted 1963); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 541-B:14 (1997) (enacted 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to -6 (West 2001);
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 1989) (enacted 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82
(2003) (enacted 1947); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.02, 2743.48 (Anderson 2001)
(enacted 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (1999) (enacted 1955); TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001 (Vernon 1997) (enacted 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-13a (Michie 2004) (enacted 1987); Wis. STAT. § 775.05 (2001) (enacted 1943).
There is also a federal compensation statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2000) (enacted 1948). The District of Columbia has such a law as well. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2421-25 (2001) (enacted 1981).
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limit recovery to between $20,000 and $50,000 regardless of duration
of imprisonment; 55 federal law caps restitution at $5,000.56

The absence of legislative largesse undoubtedly reflects the view
that the government is not always responsible for erroneous judgments. Simple trial error, mistaken identification, and good faith mistakes account for as many wrongful convictions as police and
prosecutorial misconduct. 57 Although certainly harsh to individual
victims, this situation reflects both the economic constraints of governmental entities and the grim reality that life is unfair. Indeed, legislative remedies generally draw no distinction based on the nature
and cause of the wrongful conviction. 58 Victims of police perjury thus
receive no more compensation than those wrongfully convicted due
to inadvertent jury confusion or a wholly innocent mistaken
identification.
The state's moral obligation to pay those wrongfully convicted
without fault, however, differs sharply from the legal obligation which
the state and its police officers should face for intentional civil rights
violations. When governmental misconduct, such as police perjury,
causes wrongful convictions, public policy calls for compensating the
victims adequately both to remediate their loss to the extent possible
and to deter future false testimony. 5 9 Existing state laws, however, fall
55

N.H.

REV. STAT. ANN. §

541-B:14 ($20,000);

TEX.

Cv. PRAc. &

REM. CODE ANN.

§ 103.006 ($50,000); Wis. STAT. § 775.05 ($25,000). Those jurisdictions which base
relief on longevity of wrongful confinement do not necessarily provide compensation
commensurate with the harm, though. For example, Illinois provides a graduated
compensation plan but caps recovery at $35,000 once the wrongful confinement exceeds fourteen years. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c).
56 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513.
57 See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 246 (listing a variety of other factors);
Scheck & Tofte, supra note 32, at 38-39; Innocence Project, Causes and Remedies of
Wrongful Convictions, at http://www.innocenceproject.com/causes (last visited Feb.
21, 2005) (noting that contributing causes include false confessions (15%), unreliable
informants (16%), false testimony (17%), inaccurate microscopic hair comparisons
(21%), incompetent counsel (21%), defective science (26%), prosecutorial misconduct (34%), police misconduct (38%), serology inclusion (40%), and mistaken identification (61%)); see also Tom Spring, 10,000 Innocent People Convicted Each Year, Study
Estimates, at http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/ronhuff.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2005) (noting perjury contributed to eleven percent of wrongful convictions, and eyewitness misidentifications were a factor in 52.3%).
58 See Bernhard, supra note 53, at 73 n.1 (listing applicable statutes).
59 The testimony of police officers is often decisive in the criminal justice system.
As the Mollen Commission observed: "On the word of a police officer alone a grand
jury may indict, a trial jury convict, and a judge pass sentence." MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 36; cf Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Requiring culpable officers to pay damages to the victims of their actions ...holds
out promise of both deterring and remediating violations of the Constitution.").
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far short of this goal.6
Lacking adequate legislative recourse, victims have turned to the
courts. However, because police witnesses who commit perjury at trial
enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability under the CRA, victims
must consider other theories of liability. Potential claims could be
based on (a) pretrial perjury, (b) the tort of malicious prosecution,
(c) the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, and (d) governmental
liability. None provide adequate relief.
A.

PretrialPerjury

Briscoe expressly left open the question whether absolute immu6 1 Accordingly, victims
nity also applies to perjury committed pretrial.
may consider a § 1983 claim alleging pretrial perjury. Indeed, this
theory finds support from the Supreme Court's subsequent decision
in Malley v. Briggs,62 which sustained a claim against a police officer
who allegedly submitted an arrest warrant affidavit lacking probable
cause. The Court ruled in Malley that, because "complaining witnesses" at common law held qualified, rather than absolute, immunity, complaining police officers enjoy no greater immunity under the
CRA.

63

60 Nor have recent high-profile exonerations prompted remedial legislative action. For example, in 2001, Oklahoma authorities released Jeff Pierce after he served
almost fifteen years for a crime he did not commit. The state legislature rejected
proposed legislation that would have compensated him in some respect. See Tim Talley, House Defeats Bill for Prison Lawsuits, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), May 22,
2001, at 4-A. Instead of paying damages, the legislature issued a formal apology. Id.
61 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329 n.5 (1983).
62 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
63 Id. at 340. The Court reasoned as follows:
Although the statute on its face admits of no immunities, we have read it "in
harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather
than in derogation of them." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).
Our initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983
can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts. Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984)....
[C]omplaining witnesses were not absolutely immune at common
law. In 1871, the generally accepted rule was that one who procured the
issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable
if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause. Given
malice and the lack of probable cause, the complainant enjoyed no
immunity.
Id. at 339-41; see also Scalia, supra note 10, at 1456 (arguing that Malley "furnishes the
means by which lower courts can adjust for the error made by the Supreme Court in
Briscod').
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Accordingly, the wrongfully accused may assert a § 1983 claim
based upon a complaining officer's perjury in an affidavit supporting
a warrant application. However, this theory provides only uncertain
and incomplete relief. As the police may also commit perjury in other
pretrial settings, recovery is uncertain because courts are divided over
whether absolute immunity extends to grand jury proceedings and
pretrial hearings. 64 And in cases of wrongful convictions, any relief
would be incomplete because Briscoe's absolute immunity doctrine for
witnesses precludes proof that the defendant police officer committed
perjury at the trial which produced the plaintiffs false conviction. 65
Thus, the plaintiffs proof at trial and monetary recovery would not
encompass the corrupt officer's most damaging actions. Similar issues
arise in connection with an action based on the tort of malicious
prosecution.
B.

Malicious Prosecution

The tort of malicious prosecution offers an important, albeit imperfect, vehicle to overcome the absolute immunity doctrine. Malicious prosecution requires proof that the defendant (e.g., the
complaining police officer), acting with malice and without probable
cause, effected a wrongful prosecution in which the plaintiff ultimately was exonerated. 6 6 This action differs from one based exclusively on pretrial perjury in that malicious prosecution can be based
on both sworn and unsworn false statements. 67
However, although the malicious prosecution theory offers some
potential relief, its application is quite limited. The action is ideally
suited for the rare defendant, wrongfully accused, who wins pretrial
dismissal on the merits. 68 Under such circumstances, the victim's re-

covery would include damages for mental distress, economic costs
64

Indeed, most courts extend Briscoe absolute immunity to grand jury proceed-

ings and pretrial hearings. See IA MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E.KIRKLIN, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9.10, at 298-99 (3d ed. 1997) (citing
authority).
65 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining "relevant" evidence). Although such proof
would still be admissible against a municipality to establish a pattern of wrongdoing as
required for a Monell claim, the testifying officer's absolute immunity renders such
proof a nullity as to him. See infra notes 83-94.
66 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §119, at
871 (5th ed. 1984); see, e.g., Penn v. Harris, 296 F.3d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 2002) ("A
criminal case terminates in an accused's favor when the circumstances surrounding
dismissal reflect innocence.").

67

KEETON ET AL.,

supra note 66, § 119, at 872.

68 This could occur, for example, if the magistrate dismisses the case for lack of
probable cause. See id. § 119, at 874, 881. Acquittal alone would not necessarily
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and expenses for having to destemming from wrongful detention,
69
fend a wrongful prosecution.
In other situations, however, a malicious prosecution action
could be problematic. For example, an arrest warrant might be based
upon an officer's affidavit containing false allegations. Regardless of
the defendant's ultimate exoneration, a subsequent malicious prosecution action would fail if the court finds the affidavit's remaining
7 0 Ordinarily, maliallegations sufficient to establish probable cause.
cious prosecution would also fail when a successful suppression motion (based on unconstitutional conduct) prompts the government to
dismiss charges. Because suppression motions are based on constitutional violations rather than claims of innocence, resulting dismissals
71 The defendant may
almost never directly exonerate the accused.
very well be innocent, but the record underlying the court's suppres72
sion ruling almost never addresses this issue. Absent actual exoneration, however, the malicious prosecution action fails.
Finally, even when post-conviction proceedings exonerate a
wrongfully convicted defendant, Briscoe's absolute immunity doctrine
still precludes complete relief as the plaintiff's trial-related damages
would not encompass injury stemming from the officer's trial perproduce a judgment, as the defendant could still have been guilty or the charges
otherwise supported by probable cause. See id. § 119, at 880, 885.
69 Id. § 119, at 887-89.
Moore v. Hayes, No. 97-1188, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS. 16383, at *9 (6th
70 See, e.g.,
Cir. July 14, 1998) (noting that a malicious prosecution claim "must specifically allege
either the absence of probable cause or specific instances of prosecutorial misconduct
which, if proven, would negate probable cause"); cf Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
171-72 (1978) (noting that when material in an affidavit accompanying a search warrant is shown to be false, if there remains enough content to show probable cause, an
evidentiary hearing is not required).
71 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 66, § 119, at 874 (noting that "termination must
also reflect the merits and not merely a procedural victory"); 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
at 434 (4th
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.7(b),
ed. 2004) ("[A]n at-trial granting of a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment
grounds, followed by a dismissal of the case, is a 'termination of the proceedings ...
on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence'...." (quoting People v. Greer, 282
N.W.2d 819, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979))).
72 Suppression motions involve allegations of police misconduct during the evidence gathering process. The defendant's guilt or innocence is usually irrelevant to
the court's ruling. Indeed, this is one of the features that makes the exclusionary rule
so controversial. As the Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he costs of applying the
exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review are well known: the focus of the
trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976).
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jury. 73 Full relief requires the plaintiff to prove all the events that
produced his wrongful conviction-especially those that occurred at
trial. A claim based on the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence achieves this goal to a somewhat greater degree.
C. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the defense.7 4 As this principle bears directly upon a defendant's possible innocence, a Brady violation can readily produce a wrongful conviction. Brady violations are certainly subject to § 1983 claims. 75
Relying on Brady also overcomes Briscoe's absolute immunity because,
rather than asserting a claim based on immunized perjured testimony,
the plaintiffs complaint charges that the defendant(s) withheld exculpatory evidence pretrial. 7 6 As this omission places into question the
integrity of the entire ensuing prosecution, the plaintiffs proof could
certainly include relevant portions of the criminal trial proceedings,
as well as all damages stemming from wrongful conviction.
These advantages make a Brady-based § 1983 claim more attractive than the options outlined above, but this theory of liability still has
some flaws. Foremost among them, not all police perjury necessarily
constitutes a Brady violation. Thus, a plaintiff may not overcome the
Briscoe absolute immunity doctrine simply by recasting his action as a
Brady claim. 77 For example, it is not necessarily enough to allege that
73 See generally 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.4 (2d ed. 1993)
(describing damages in constitutional civil cases). Plaintiff, however, could recover
other economic and emotional damages associated with having to mount a trial
defense.
74 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
75 See, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that withholding of exculpatory fingerprint evidence from the prosecutor by police
supported a valid claim under § 1983);Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 662-63 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (arguing that intentional, "bad faith" withholding of evidence to
deprive a criminal defendant of use of that evidence at trial supports a § 1983 claim);
Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1558-59 (5th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing between
absolute immunity for trial testimony and potential liability for deliberate concealment of exculpatory evidence).
76 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text; see also McCullah v. Gadert, 344
F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing between Brady and Briscoe claims); lenco
v.City of Chicago, 286 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Neither the withholding of
exculpatory information nor the initiation of constitutionally infirm criminal proceedings is protected by absolute immunity .... [N]o absolute immunity attaches to
the actions of the officers outside of trial ....").
77 See Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 2003). The court rejected a
Brady claim because the plaintiff knew what he said at his interrogation. Id. ("The
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the police officer perjured himself at trial and withheld his knowledge
of the defendant's innocence. To succeed, the civil rights plaintiff
must demonstrate some active concealment or withholding of exculpatory evidence. 78 As such information is usually within control of
police authorities, this evidentiary burden poses serious obstacles for
civil rights plaintiffs.
Moreover, Brady only requires that prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. This obligation does not run to the pocounsel. 79
lice, as they are not expected to have contact with defense
The police face liability under Brady only if they conceal or withhold
80
exculpatory evidence from the prosecuting agency. Shockingly, if a
police officer makes full disclosure to prosecutors who, in turn, violate
Brady and conspire to have the officer commit perjury at trial, neither
the individual prosecutors nor the police officers would necessarily
face individual liability under the CRA. Under such circumstances,
Briscoe confers absolute immunity for the officer's perjured testimony
at trial, and prosecutors would escape liability because they enjoy absolute civil immunity for trial functions, including the failure to satisfy
Brady.8 ' Moreover, most circuits have extended absolute immunity
under Briscoe to prosecutors alleged to have conspired with a witness
problem was not that evidence useful to him was being concealed; the problem was
that the detectives were giving false evidence.").
78 See id.; Manning v. Dye, No. 02-C372, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12649, at *3-4
(N.D. 11.July 18, 2003) (distinguishing between Briscoe and Brady and emphasizing
officers' active concealment of evidence); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,
281-82 (1999) ("The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have
ensued.").
79 See, e.g., Mowbrayv. Cameron County, Texas, 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2001)
("Brady imposes a duty on prosecutors to share exculpatory evidence with the de[O]ur research reveals no case extending Brady to police officers . . ").
fense ....
80 See, e.g., id. at 278 n.5 (noting that the plaintiff failed to allege that the police
concealed exculpatory evidence from the prosecution); Jean, 221 F.3d at 660 (holding
that the Brady duty of disclosure to a criminal defendant rests with the prosecution).
81 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-29 (1976) (holding that prosecutors
enjoy absolute immunity for allegedly using perjured testimony and suppressing exculpatory evidence); see also Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Willful or malicious prosecutorial misconduct is egregious by definition, yet prosecutors
are absolutely immune from liability for such conduct if it occurs in the exercise of
their advocatory function."); Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369, 1373
n.4 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Whether the claim involves withholding evidence, failing to
correct a misconception or instructing a witness to testify evasively, absolute immunity
from civil damages is the rule for prosecutors.").
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to commit perjury. 8 2 Given these obstacles, a claim alleging governmental liability may provide the most viable option under § 1983.
D.

Governmental Liability

In Monell v. Department of Social Services,8 3 the Supreme Court overruled an earlier decision that had found municipalities "wholly immune from suit under section 1983." 84 Monell declined to hold
municipalities vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, reasoning that Congress did not intend the existence of an
employment relationship alone to be sufficient to warrant statutory
damages. 85 However, Justice Brennan's majority opinion concluded
that both the text and legislative history of § 1983 demonstrated Congress's intent to impose municipal liability where "the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a [municipal]
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted. ' 86 In addition, because constitutional violations often occur
outside formal parameters, the Court recognized that § 1983 also imposes municipal liability "for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not
received formal approval through the body's official decision making
87
channels."
As a Monell claim addresses a municipality's pattern of civil rights
violations, it should prevail notwithstanding an individual officer's successful assertion of Briscoe's absolute immunity defense. Monells focus
on municipal liability renders irrelevant both evidentiary proof of individual liability88 and Briscoe's concerns about the need to protect
individual witnesses from financial harassment or intimidation. In
82 See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The majority
of circuits that have addressed the issue have extended the absolute immunity for a
witness's trial testimony under Briscoe to those persons who allegedly conspire with the
witness to present allegedly false testimony."); see also Robinson, 940 F.2d at 1373 n.4
("Whether the claim involves withholding evidence, failing to correct a misconception or instructing a witness to testify evasively, absolute immunity from civil damages
is the rule for prosecutors.").
83 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
84 Id. at 662-63 (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
85 Id. at 693-94; see I SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION-THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 6:5 (4th ed. 2004).
86 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
87 Id. at 690-91.
88 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevance in terms of elements of a cause of
action). Rather than establishing individual liability, plaintiff would introduce evidence of the officer's perjury as part of an overall pattern of misconduct triggering
municipal liability.
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short, because a Monell claim does not hinge on establishing an individual officer's liability, a witness's absolute immunity defense under
Briscoe should not defeat a Monell claim of municipal liability.
Monel, therefore, offers the wrongfully convicted a potentially viable option. Indeed, it holds special promise in view of subsequent
decisions extending municipal liability to local governments that act
89
with "deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights. This line of
authority could dramatically impact civil rights claims involving police
widespread evidence that supervisors routinely tolerate
perjury given
"testilying." 90
Despite its potential, however, Monell remains remarkably un9 1 The decision certainly is not
derutilized in police perjury cases.
without serious obstacles and limitations. First, as Monell applies only
to local governmental bodies, it does not reach states or state law enforcement agencies. 92 Second, Monell only concerns alleged constitu93
tional deprivations

that reflect a policy, practice,

or custom;

municipal liability under the CRA ordinarily does not exist for isolated
9 4 Therefore, a Monell
violations resulting in wrongful conviction.
claim imposes more demanding elements of proof than do § 1983 actions based on individual liability. Finally, even when a plaintiff can
prove these elements, the Supreme Court has ruled that punitive dam89 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85,
§ 6:41; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-40 (1994) (elaborating upon the
deliberate indifference standard).

90

See, e.g.,

MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 1, at 40 ("What is particularly

troublesome about this practice [of police falsifications] is that it is widely tolerated by
corrupt and honest officers alike, as well as their supervisors."); Alan Dershowitz, Police Head Confirms "Testilying, " TIMES UNION (Albany), Nov. 25, 1995, at A7 (quoting a
police commissioner who said that "cops are almost taught how to commit perjury
when they are in the police academy"); Dershowitz, supra note 33 (noting that prosecutors, in effect, train officers to "tailor their testimony to the requirements of the
law"); Anthony Flint, Bratton Calls 'Testilying' by Police a Real Concern, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 15, 1995, at Al (noting "young officers generally learn how to testify... through
on-the-job training" and reporting a police commissioner's call for improved
training).
91 For example, on April 15, 2004, a Lexis search produced only seventy-seven
cases (between 1978 and 2004) discussing possibly pertinent terms.
92 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1989).
93 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
94 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 6:40; see, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (reversing because a jury instruction permitted an isolated
incident to serve as the basis for § 1983 liability). Tuttle allowed for the possibility of a
single incident triggering Monell liability if "proof of the incident includes proof that
it was caused by an existing unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be
attributed to a municipal policy maker." Id. at 824. "Failure to train" cases may fall
within this realm of proof. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 6:39.
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ages may not be imposed against a municipality for policies and practices established by its officials. 95 Thus, despite evidence of systematic
and egregious official misconduct, a plaintiff may only recover compensatory damages. Punitive damages are generally available in
§ 1983 actions alleging individual liability, 9 6 but in wrongful conviction cases, Briscoe renders this sanction wholly illusory, as the police
officer who committed perjury at trial-often the most blameworthy
individual-enjoys absolute immunity under the CRA.
Thus, current law affords no reliable monetary recourse for the
wrongfully convicted. Nor does it adequately deter police perjury.
Achieving these twin goals requires legislative reform.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE REFORM

The Supreme Court's decision in Briscoe, which held that police
officers who commit perjury enjoy absolute immunity for their trial
testimony, undermined a major objective of the CRA: holding state
officials accountable for violating constitutional rights. 97 In reaching
this decision, the Court strayed from conventional principles of statutory construction and relied upon a questionable analysis of legislative
history to read the words "every person" out of the statute. 98 However,
even if the Court concluded accurately that the Forty-Second Congress intended to incorporate common law immunities into the CRA,
this ruling need not control modern civil rights litigation indeterminately. Congress remains free to revisit this issue in light of current
civil rights abuses and to repeal a common law immunity no longer
suited to modern needs.99 Remarkably, although the National Institute of Justice at the Department of Justice documented twenty-eight
95

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981).
See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 4:42 (identifying relevant factors for punitive
damages awards).
97 See supra notes 5, 12, 25 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
96

99 The Supreme Court "look[s] to the common law and other history for guidance because ... [its] role is 'not to make a freewheeling policy choice,' but rather
to discern Congress' likely intent in enacting § 1983." Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
493 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). Even the Court,
however, has declined to allow "arcane rules of the common law" to control the "precise contours of official immunity." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987)
(noting that the Court has "reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at
all embodied in the common law"). Congress enjoys even more latitude in this regard, since the scope of any statutory immunity is more properly a legislative function.
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wrongful felony convictions in 1996,100 Congress has neither fully investigated this issue nor carefully considered to what extent police
perjury contributed to these miscarriages of justice.10 ' Extensive congressional hearings would bear out the concerns this Article has identified and provide the foundation for carefully tailored legislative
reform eliminating absolute CRA immunity for police witnesses.
Such reform would provide needed relief for victims of police
perjury. It would also promote effective law enforcement. As police
perjury has become a more pervasive problem, the public's view of law
enforcement witnesses has become more skeptical and made juries
less inclined to return guilty verdicts. 10 2 Legislative reform would begin the process necessary to restore public confidence in the criminal
justice system.
Such reform need not defeat any legitimate policy considerations
underlying the Briscoe decision. In addition to its analysis of legislative
history, the Supreme Court identified three interrelated concerns: (1)
that fear of subsequent litigation might make some witnesses "reluctant to come forward to testify,"' 10 3 (2) that those who do testify might
04
distort or soften their testimony to reduce the risk of future liability,
EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CONVICTED BYJURIES, EXONERDNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER TRIAL 12 (1996).
101 For example, since 1996 Congress has only conducted a few hearings concerning wrongful convictions and enacted no ameliorative legislation. For the most part,
Congress has focused on DNA issues to the exclusion of others. Some witnesses, however, have addressed a broader range of problems. See Margery Malkin Koosed, The

100

ATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF

Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Identifications, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 268-71 (2002); Barry C. Scheck, PreventingExecution of the Innocent:
Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1170-71
(2001).
102 For example, police perjury played a significant role in the OJ. Simpson trial.
See Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1037-40; James Sterngold, Detective in Simpson Case
Pleads No Contest to Perjury Count, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,1996, at A16. Its role in Simpson's
acquittal, of course, is unknown. However, at least one expert has observed that when
"police routinely and casually lie under oath .. . members of the public, including

those who serve on juries, [are] less willing to believe all police, truthful or not."
Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1039; see also Ed Godfrey, Poll Shows Oklahomans Distrust
System, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), May 27, 2001, at 1-A (reporting results of

a poll taken after the discovery of wrongful conviction based on perjured testimony);
Joe Sexton, JurorsQuestion Honesty of Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at B3 (reporting
distrust of New York City police officers because of perjury scandals).
103 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983).
104 Id. The Court observed that "[a] witness who knows that he might be forced to
defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, might be inclined to shade
his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to
deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence." Id.
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and (3) "that those involved in judicial proceedings should 'be given
every encouragement to make full disclosure of all pertinent information within their knowledge.' "105
Although the Briscoe Court declined to distinguish between private citizens and police witnesses,' 0 6 these concerns do not apply with
equal force to law enforcement personnel. In contrast to private citizens, police officers are duty bound to testify about criminal activityfor them, testifying is not a matter of choice. Nor would any officer
have incentive to soften his testimony in favor of the defense. If anything, securing a defendant's conviction reduces the risk of future litigation accusing the officer of peijury. This is especially true after the
Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Heck v. Humphrey'0 7 held that, to
avoid "'creat[ing] .. .two [potentially] conflicting resolutions arising
out of the same or identical transaction,"' 1 08 a § 1983 claimant may
not recover without first establishing that his original conviction was
invalidated either on direct appeal or through the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus. 10 9 Heck thereby eliminates one of the principal concerns underlying the Briscoedecision: that since "'[t] he loser
in one forum will frequently seek relief in another ...[a] bsolute immunity is ...necessary to assure that ... witnesses can perform...
without harassment or intimidation."' 1 10
The Heck decision avoids the possibility of conflicting decisions
being issued by those courts reviewing an individual's conviction and
others reviewing his § 1983 claim for damages stemming from that
conviction.I' As a result, however, Heck undermines Briscoe's concern
"'that those involved in judicial proceedings should be given every
encouragement to make a full disclosure of all pertinent information
within their knowledge.' "' 112 Instead, Briscoe and Heck, taken together, discourage full disclosure; they permit officers to lie with impunity at trial, knowing that a § 1983 claimant may not challenge
perjured testimony without first invalidating his underlying conviction
and, even then, absolute immunity protects them from civil liability.
105

Id. at 335 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 439 (1976) (White, J.,

concurring)).

106 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
107 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
108 Id. at 484 (quoting 8 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5
(1991)).
109 Id. at 486-87.
110 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978)).
111 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484.
112 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 439 (1976)
(White, J., concurring)); see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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This result goes beyond any legitimate purpose of witness immunity
and makes a mockery of the criminal justice system.
The Supreme Court originally relied on both common law doctrine and historical analysis to read absolute immunity into § 1983.113
Such immunity is premised on the need to ensure that government
officials can function effectively without fear of litigation for exercising important discretionary functions. Accordingly, "[t] he policy underlying absolute immunity is a concern with the chilling effect of
potential section 1983 damages litigation upon the exercise of decision-making authority."1 1 4 Because absolute immunity confers com115
plete immunity from suit and not just protection against liability,
officials seeking this unique status must demonstrate that "such an
116
exemption is justified by overriding considerations of public policy."
Prior to Briscoe, the Court declined to extend absolute immunity
beyond a very limited class of officials, including the President of the
United States, legislators carrying out their legislative functions, and
judges carrying out their judicial functions, "whose specialfunctions or
1 1 7 Police witconstitutional status requires complete protection from suit.
nesses, by comparison, fall far short of this threshold. Unlike other
beneficiaries of absolute immunity, their function at trial does not- or
at least should not-involve any discretionary function. Police officers
do not have discretion to commit perjury, nor does their trial testimony involve any other constitutional decisionmaking function.
Moreover, to the degree that officers merit protection from potentially abusive litigation, less drastic means than complete immunity
from suit under the CRA are available. Recognizing that relatively few
categories of potential defendants warrant such broad immunity, the
Supreme Court has conferred qualified immunity upon others deserving of some lesser measure of protection. 118 Although not complete
protection from suit, qualified immunity provides an affirmative defense for conduct that "does not violate clearly established statutory or
113 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-78 (1950); see also Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (stating that § 1983 immunity is "predicated
upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it").
114 2 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 7:1.
115 Id.
116 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (emphasis added).
117 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (emphasis added).
118 "The availability of qualified immunity reflects a balance between the interest
in preventing, and compensating for, constitutional violations and the interest in
avoiding the overdeterrence of independent decision making by government officials." 2 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 8:1.
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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."' 19

According to the Supreme Court, qualified immunity provides

"ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law" 120 and adequately shields police officers
sued in connection with their "investigative" functions. 121 By conferring absolute immunity upon officers performing their "'judicial'
function" as trial witnesses, Briscoe produced the anomaly of allowing
an officer to face § 1983 liability for knowingly filing a false police
report-which neither absolute nor qualified immunity protects-yet
precluding liability for committing the more serious offense of perjury
at a criminal trial. 122 In other words, because qualified immunity
would suffice, Briscoe simply goes too far, and it creates perverse
incentives.
As Briscoe has become firmly embedded judicial doctrine, 12 3 only
legislative reform can restore proper symmetry and accountability
under the CRA. Thus far, however, no Briscoe critic has offered a legislative solution directly responsive to the Supreme Court's analysis of
the CRA. One commentator, for example, approached the problem
indirectly by proposing elimination of the exclusionary rule to remove
the incentive for police perjury. 124 That proposal, however, is neither
practical nor desirable. Although admittedly controversial, the exclusionary rule is constitutionally based. 125 Short of a constitutional
119 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added).
120 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
121 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); cf.Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 500
U.S. 259, 273-74 (1993) (distinguishing between a prosecutor's investigative and judicial functions). Note that the evidentiary elements of a perjury-based § 1983 action
actually protect an officer more than the qualified immunity defense because perjury
requires proof that the officer lied intentionally. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 359
F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that perjury requires a knowingly false declaration); United States v. Leonos-Marquez, 323 F.3d 679, 684 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
perjury requires intent to provide false testimony). In contrast, incompetent or knowing conduct renders the officer liable. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122 See Scott v. Hem, 216 F.3d 897, 911-12 (10th Cir. 2000) (implying that even if
an officer included knowingly false information in a police report which would support an action under § 1983, the officer was entitled to absolute immunity for any
claims arising out of perjury at trial); cf. Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41 (holding that
qualified immunity provides sufficient protection to police officers applying for
warrants).
123 See lA ScHWARTz & KutKLIN, supra note 64, § 9.10 (setting forth a wide range of
illustrative decisions applying Briscoe absolute immunity to witnesses).
124 Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1057-59.
125 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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amendment, Congress may not repeal it.126 Further, although the
problem of police perjury is certainly an important issue in the debate
over the exclusionary rule, there are many others of great complexity. 127 Allowing concern with police perjury to drive this debate would
improperly reward officers who choose to oppose the exclusionary
128
rule by corrupting the judicial process.
Rather than tamper with the exclusionary rule, Congress should
begin to address the problem of police perjury by amending § 1983 to
eliminate absolute immunity for law enforcement witnesses. 129 Under
this proposal, such witnesses would still retain qualified immunity.
Further, private witnesses would retain Briscoe's protections. The common law grounds for absolute immunity still apply with equal force to
private witnesses, as their cooperation is often vital to effective law enforcement. Moreover, no evidence exists that private witness perjury
is a pervasive problem in the criminal justice system. The following
text would implement this reform:
The Civil Rights Perjury Prevention Act
The text of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 is amended as follows:
Immunities:
QualifiedImmunity: Liability under section 1983 shall not extend to any
law enforcement officer whose conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.
126

13 0

See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress may not

legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.").
127 See, e.g., 1 LAFAvE, supra note 71, § 1.2 (containing extensive discussion of multiple issues concerning the exclusionary rule).

128 This would be especially ironic, as the Supreme Court originally developed the
rule due to concern that admitting illegally obtained evidence undermines judicial
integrity. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914). See generally Gerard V.
Bradley, Present at the Creation?A Critical Guide to Weeks v. United States and Its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1031 (1986) (tracing the history of both the exclusionary
rule's development and the criticism of the rule).
129 Indeed, Congress could use this occasion wisely to review all judicially created
immunities under the CRA and to repeal those no longer appropriate to modern civil
rights enforcement. As former SenatorJohn McClellan observed in another context:
"Congress in fulfilling its proper legislative role must examine not only individual
[I]t has a duty not to engage in piecemeal legislainstances, but whole problems ....
tion. Whatever the limited occasion for the identification of a problem, Congress has
the duty of enacting a principled solution to the entire problem." 116 CONG. REC.
18,914 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).

130

This text codifies the Supreme Court's standard for qualified immunity. See

supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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Absolute Immunity: Except as stated below, United States Supreme Court
decisions defining absolute immunity remain in full force and effect. 131
Exception: No employee or agent132 of any law enforcement agency is entitled to absolute immunity for testifying or providingany statements, under oath
or affirmation, in connection with a criminal investigation or any court
133

proceeding.

CONCLUSION

In 1992, despite international protest, a Time magazine cover
story,1 34 and a papal plea for leniency, the State of Virginia executed
Roger Coleman for a rape and murder that he probably did not com131 Legislation sometimes cross references prevailing Supreme Court decisions.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) (2000). In this instance, the cross reference serves to
retain absolute immunity for legislators performing legislative functions and for
judges and prosecutors performing judicial functions. See supra notes 18, 81 and accompanying text. Of course, after conducting a more comprehensive review of prevailing CRA immunities, Congress may choose to eliminate some of them by adding
to the enumerated exceptions.
132 The proposal extends to agents because a heightened risk of perjury exists
whenever a witness has a close relationship with a law enforcement agency. Typical
examples might include paid informants and defendants working to win "substantial
assistance" departures from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged,Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do the FederalSentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835, 866-69
(1993) (discussing the risks and moral implications of permitting substantial assistance sentencing reductions in exchange for cooperation); A. Jack Finklea, Note, Leniency in Exchange for Testimony: Bribery or Effective Prosecution?, 33 IND. L. REV. 957,
977-79 (2000) (criticizing substantial assistance departures for promoting inaccurate
testimony). See generally Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases,
45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 23-33 (1992) (discussing risks of perjured testimony stemming
from cooperation agreements). Federal courts have expressed similar concerns. See
United States v. Jones, 145 F.3d 959, 970 (8th Cir. 1998) (Bright, J., dissenting)
("[T]here are serious inherent incentives to perjury; and prosecutors indulge a wide
variety of unstructured practices with respect to substantial assistance motions.");
United States v. Mansker, 240 F. Supp. 2d 902, 921 (N.D. Iowa 2003) ("[S]ubstantial
reductions in sentences for cooperating against others, have, in my view, brought
enormous pressure on cooperators to stretch the truth and to provide previously unknown and all too often false information to federal prosecutors in exchange for...
substantial assistance motions.").
133 The proposed text makes clear that absolute immunity does not apply to any
statements or testimony under oath. This broad language eliminates an existing circuit conflict concerning pretrial testimony. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
134 Jill Smolowe, Must This Man Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40 (cover story). Prior
to the Coleman article, Time magazine had not devoted a cover story to a condemned
prisoner since 1960. JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT 274 (1997).
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mit. 135 At best, a crucial police witness testified inaccurately at Cole-

man's trial. At worst, the officer committed perjury. 136 Under the
CRA, the distinction between inaccurate testimony and perjury makes
trial witno difference, however, as Briscoe v. LaHue conferred all
13 7
nesses, including police officers, with absolute immunity.
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Briscoe reflected questionable
analyses of both statutory text and legislative history. After more than
twenty years, however, these points are no longer worth debating. As
a matter of sound social policy, Congress should intervene to repeal
absolute immunity for law enforcement witnesses. Police officers
would still enjoy ample protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Of course, legislative reform requires political action. But
even in today's highly charged political atmosphere, this issue need
not be divisive. Regardless of ideology, all should agree that convicting the innocent offends basic principles of justice-especially since it
13
also permits the true violator to go unpunished.

8

Much remains to be done to reduce the risk of false convictions.
Amending the CRA to provide a civil remedy for victims of police perjury would be a long overdue first step.

135 See TUCKER, supranote 134, at 315-30. Today, Coleman's supporters are working to exonerate him through DNA analysis. Lois Romano, When DNA Meets Death
Row, It's the System That's Tested, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2003, at Al.
136 See TUCKER, supra note 134, at 66 (noting the inconsistency and an officer acknowledging inaccurate testimony).
137 Absent such immunity, Coleman's estate could have filed a civil rights action
on his behalf. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 1.12.
138 See Scott Christianson, After 14 Years, Another Crack atJustice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2005, § 14LI, at 13, available at 2005 WLNR 1273417.
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